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SURVEY SECTION
Employment Law. Folan v. Department of Children, Youth, and
Families, 723 A.2d 287 (R.I. 1999). The exclusivity clause of the
Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) does not bar independent stat-
utory claims which further a fundamental public policy, such as
the prevention of employment discrimination under the Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act (FEPA) and the Civil Rights Act (CRA).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
While employed as a child protective investigator for the De-
partment of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), the plaintiff,
Carol B. Folan (Folan), alleged that her supervisor, Frederick
Lumb (Lumb), sexually harassed her.' As a result of this harass-
ment, the Workers' Compensation Court found that Folan suffered
an "occupational stress" injury while employed by DCYF, and
awarded benefits to Folan under the WCA for total incapacity.
Following the Workers' Compensation Court's decision, the
plaintiff filed a complaint seeking compensation for lost wages and
damages under the state Fair Employment Practices Act,2 the
Civil Rights Act of 1990,3 article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island
Constitution 4 and the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities stat-
utes.5 The superior court granted the defendants' motion to dis-
miss the complaint, reasoning "that plaintiffs election of benefits
under the WCA barred her later action for the same injuries in [a
trial court]."6 This case came before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court on the appeal of the plaintiff.7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The correct interpretation of the WCA's exclusivity clause was
the issue in this case. 8 That statute reads in pertinent part:
1. See Folan v. Department of Children, Youth, and Families, 723 A.2d 287,
289 (R.I. 1999). "Lumb's harassment allegedly consisted of both verbal and physi-
cal acts, including physical assaults on the plaintiff, attempts to molest her, send-
ing gifts and flowers, writing notes, and implying a sexual affair to other co-
workers." Id.
2. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-1 to -41 (1956) (1995 Reenactment & Supp. 1999).
3. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 (1956) (1999 Supp.).
4. R.I. Const. art. I, § 2.
5. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-87-1 to -51 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).
6. Folan, 723 A.2d at 289.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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Rights in lieu of other rights and remedies.-The right to
compensation for an injury under chapters 29-38 of this title,
and the remedy therefor granted by those chapters, shall be
in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now ex-
isting, either at common law or otherwise against an em-
ployer, or its directors, officers, agents, or employees; and
those rights and remedies shall not accrue to employees enti-
tled to compensation under those chapters while they are in
effect, except as otherwise provided in §§ 28-36-10 and 28-36-
15.9
Folan argued that the exclusivity clause of the WCA did not
prohibit "independent statutory causes of action."' 0 Conversely,
the defendants argued that the "or otherwise" phrase in the exclu-
sivity clause barred Folan from receiving WCA benefits and pre-
serving an ensuing action based upon the same injuries.",
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that where statutes
appear to conflict, the court must determine the intent of the legis-
lature in enacting each statute, imputing to each enactment the
meaning concurrent with the legislature's policies and clear pur-
poses. 12 The court has recognized that "'[sitatutes which relate to
the same subject matter should be considered together so that they
will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their gen-
eral objective scope [even if] ... the statutes in question contain no
reference to each other and are passed at different times.' ' 13 Since
the statutes in question do not expressly state their interrelation-
ship, the court proceeded to consider the objectives of each
statute.14
WCA
Enacted in 1912, the WCA established an alternative system
of compensation for employees injured on the job.15 Under the
WCA, employees waive their right to maintain an action in tort
against their employer in exchange for a statutorily mandated rate
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 (1956) (1995 Reenactment) (emphasis added).
10. Folan, 723 A.2d at 289.
11. See id.
12. See id. (citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987)).
13. Id. at 289-90 (quoting State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I.
1981)).
14. See id. at 290.
15. See id.
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of compensation. 16 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has pointed
out that "the WCA embodies a legislative compromise between the
interests of employees and employers in regard to work-related
injuries."17
The WCA's exclusivity provision ensures the viability of this
legislative compromise for the employer by extinguishing an em-
ployee's other rights and remedies for compensated injuries.' 8
From a policy perspective, "the exclusivity clause is 'intended to
preclude any common-law action against an employer, substituting
a statutory remedy at the election of the employee when he enters
employment.'" 19 By taking away an employee's right to a tort ac-
tion and removing certain defenses from an employer, the WCA
provides a quick and simple mechanism for injured employees to
be compensated.20
FEPA and CRA
Declaring a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of age,
disability, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation,
the legislature passed the FEPA in 1949.21 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court noted that "[ulnlike the WCA, the FEPA is con-
cerned with safeguarding an employee's right to obtain and hold
employment without being subjected to discrimination."22 Recog-
nizing the negative domestic effects and economic inequities
caused by discrimination, the legislature acted to protect the pub-
lic health, safety and welfare. 23
Similar to the FEPA, the legislature enacted the CRA in 1990,
providing equal protection for "'all persons within the state, re-
gardless of race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of
ancestoral origin .... ,-24 The CRA outlines the specific rights of
Rhode Island citizens that are protected from any form of employ-
ment discrimination. 25
16. See id.
17. Id. (citing DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I. 1992)).
18. See id.
19. Id. (quoting Hornsby v. Southland Corp., 487 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 1985)).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-3 (1956) (Supp. 1999)).
23. See id.
24. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 (1956) (Supp. 1999)).
25. See id.
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Solution
In resolving the conflict between the exclusivity clause of the
WCA and the goals of the FEPA and the CRA, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court noted that a Wisconsin case, Byers v. Labor and
Industry Review Commission,26 expressly distinguished the WCA
from the FEPA and the CRA.2 7 The Byers court remarked that
"'Itihe WCA focuses on the employee and his or her work-related
injury while the [FEPA and the CRA] focus on employer conduct
that undermines equal opportunity in the workplace. '"'28 Addition-
ally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court commented that "'the WFEA
[Wisconsin Fair Employment Act] is concerned with ... eliminat-
ing a discriminatory environment in the workplace that affects not
only the victim of discrimination but the entire workforce and the
public welfare." 29 Finally, the Byers court determined that, since
the WCA did not adequately address employment discrimination,
the Wisconsin legislature intended for the WFEA to effectuate the
public policy opposed to discriminatory practices in the
workplace. 30
Recognizing the different purposes of the WCA contrasted
against the FEPA and the CRA, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
concluded "that the Legislature did not intend the exclusivity pro-
vision of the WCA to bar the independent statutory claims created
by the FEPA or the CRA."31 The court reasoned that permitting
the exclusivity clause to prevent claims under the FEPA and the
CRA would nullify these anti-discrimination statutes, contrary to
the legislature's intent.32 Nonetheless, the court pointed out that
any money damages received through the WCA should be credited
against awards achieved under the FEPA or the CRA.3 3 Satisfied
that "the FEPA and the CRA provide comprehensive remedies for
employer discrimination," the court found it unnecessary to con-
26. 561 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1997).
27. See Folan, 723 A.2d at 291.
28. Id. (quoting Byers, 561 N.W.2d at 682).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 292.
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sider the plaintiffs claim under article 1, section 2, of the Rhode
Island Constitution. 34
CONCLUSION
In Folan v. Department of Children, Youth and Families, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the exclusivity
clause of the WCA does not bar claims under the FEPA or the
CRA. While the exclusivity provision is applicable to some statu-
tory claims, it cannot be used to undermine fundamental public
policy, such as the prevention of employment discrimination.
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34. Id. Furthermore, the court expressed no opinion on the plaintiffs claim
under the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities statutes, leaving it for trial. See
id. at 292 n.2.
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